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1In June 1999, online auction company eBay experienced a 22-hour period in which its site was shut down due to operating system problems.
Over a two-day period, eBay lost 25% of its stock value, or six billion dollars (Glover et al. 2001, pg. 76).
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This study identifies the risks to e-commerce using a diverse sample of Internet and other firms by assessing
the stock market reaction to hacker attacks. The research issue is, do expert business risk assessors perceive
that Internet activity and e- commerce risks per se generate incremental risk of financial distress? 
Keywords:  Event study, e-commerce risk, hacker attacks, stock market reaction.
INTRODUCTION
A major stream of recent research has investigated the economic consequences of resources devoted to information technology
(IT) in business settings. Economic consequences have been captured using a variety of variables, such as abnormal stock returns
and return on assets. Resources devoted to IT also have been measured in various ways, such as press announcements of
significant IT investments, and announcements of newly created chief information officer positions. Almost without exception,
such studies have sought evidence of the benefits of resources devoted to IT. This orientation is reflected in the titles of papers
that review this literature:  The Impact of Information Technology Investments on Firm Performance:  A Review of the
Literature (Sircar et al. 1998) and Returns to Information Systems Investments: A Review of the Literature (Dehning and
Richardson 2001). Early studies that failed to document benefits of IT investment gave rise to the productivity paradox
(Brynjolfsson 1993). More recent studies that detect such benefits are said to have taken us beyond the productivity paradox
(Brynjolfsson and Hitt 1998). One can readily understand why academic researchers who teach information systems courses have
sought evidence of IT success. What appears to be missing, however, is some balance in the literature. It is an economic truism
that, in an uncertain world, rewards are earned by bearing risk. In this paper, we attempt to assess the risks borne by a set of firms
highly reliant on information technology: the so-called Internet firms.
Knowledgeable observers allege that Internet firms typically experience operating risks that do not affect more traditional firms
(Glover et al. 2001; Greenstein and Feinman 2000).  A major source of such risk is the firms complete reliance on IT when
conducting such fundamental operations as buying and selling goods. When these firms experience interruptions of service, they
literally cease to function for a period of time.1  Glover et al. define and discuss other problems primarily affecting Internet firms
such as data theft, unauthorized access to passwords, customer impersonation, false Web sites, e-mail or Web-visit hijacking, and
compromised customer privacy. In addition to risks that arise from specific incidents, Internet firms allegedly are subject to risks
that are more nebulous, but still very real, such as the unforeseen and sudden advent of competitors, and the risk that consumers
will not accept the firms new business models. In summary, firms that are heavily engaged in e-commerce are subject to a variety
of e-specific risks, including unusually high reliance on IT.
This study investigates whether capital markets participants believe e-commerce activity subjects Internet companies to
incremental firm-specific risk. We employ several variables that proxy for the extent of a firms e-commerce risks. First, we
employ a dichotomous variable to divide Internet firms into two sub-samples. The variable is coded one for Internet e-tailers
(B2C firms). The business press has expressed the view that e-tailers are at increasing risk of failure compared to other firms. The
variable is coded zero for Internet firms that are not e-tailers (B2B firms). We also derive a number of metrics from firms
descriptions of their business risks, made in filings to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). We are particularly
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interested in several metrics that arguably capture self-assessed risks arising from reliance on IT: risk due to Internet technology
change, risk due to inadequate infrastructure, and risk due to on-line security breach.
Numerous studies have computed abnormal common stock returns to investigate whether stockholders benefit when firms
announce incremental resources devoted to IT (among others, Chatterjee et al. 2001; Dos Santos et al. 1993; Im et al. 2001;
Subramani and Walden 2001).  We examine investors reactions to a major occurrence of e-commerce risk: distributed denial of
service attacks launched by hackers against several of the best-known Internet firms in February 2000. We find that extent of
negative abnormal returns are associated with most of the e-risk metrics employed. Investors appear to believe the likelihood an
Internet firm will suffer harm in similar future attacks is positively related to its self-disclosed vulnerability to e-risks, including
measures of reliance on IT. The negative abnormal returns observed are substantial in magnitude and do not reverse over time.
SETTING AND HYPOTHESES
Investor enthusiasm for technology firms, especially Internet firms, arguably reached its peak early in the year 2000. In February
2000, one observer characterized the situation as follows:
A pack of investors these days is downright contemptuous of managers who look at fundamentals. To this hard-
charging group, almost no price is to high to pay for a rapidly growing tech stock. If you dont believe in this
new paradigm, youre a loser.  (Dreman, 2000, pg. 172)
Another member of the business press, also writing in February, 2000, stated that hype surrounding the Internet had created a
situation in which Mere profits have no place in the land of infinite possibility (Pfeiffer 2000a, pg. 70).  However, this writer
also quoted a veteran Silicon Valley venture capitalist, who earlier had warned:
There is an Armageddon thats going to happen in the spring, after all those companies spend their huge
advertising budgets in the fourth quarterseeking brand recognition and identificationonly to fail and come
out broke on the other side.  (Pfeiffer 2000b, pg. 68)
The writer concluded (pg. 68): Soon, perhaps very soon, what we will be left with is cold, hard reality and a lot of dying dot-
coms. Already, in February 2000, venture capital support for business-to-consumer (B2C or e-tailer) Internet startups was
evaporating, although business-to-business (B2B) plans still were finding favor (Byron 2000).
On Sunday, February 6, through Tuesday, February 8, numerous well-known Internet firms operations were brought to a
standstill by attacks launched by hackers (Glover et al. 2001, p. 73). The victims of the attacks primarily were B2C firms, and
included Yahoo!, Amazon.com, eBay, and Buy.com among others. A BusinessWeek commentary stated: 
Cyber crime is becoming one of the Nets growth businesses. The recent spate of attacks that gummed up Web
sites for hoursknown as denial of serviceis only one type....Indeed, the tactic used to create mayhem in
the past few days is actually one of the more innocuous ones.  (Sager et al., February 21, 2000)
This study investigates stock market reaction to the February attacks. These occurrences are ideal for an event study of investors
reactions to e-risk because (1) the attacks were sudden and unexpected and (2) the attacks exposed the vulnerability of the best-
known and largest Internet firms to risks that are highly specific to e-commerce. 
The stock markets reaction to the widely publicized February hacker attacks can be conceptualized as follows. The market value
of a firms equity at time 1, MVE1, is equal to the present value of expected future cash flows, as of time 1, to equity investors:
MVE1 = PV(ECF1)
The expected future cash flows at time 1, ECF1, reflect all information publicly available to investors at that time. The hacker
attacks likely provided investors with new information: that such attacks are more probable than previously thought and that their
consequences are more adverse than previously estimated. The market was forcefully reminded that hacker attacks can take
down even the best known Internet firms, and that such attacks deprive firms selling via the Internet of sales and cash flows. It
is important to realize that investors do not simply reduce estimated cash flows for firms actually attacked to reflect those actual
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attacks. Instead, investors anticipate additional attacks in future on firms that are similar to the ones attacked. Following the
hacker attacks, the value of a firms equity can be modeled as:
MVE2 = PV(ECF2)
The market value of equity at time 2 equals the present value of previously expected cash flows to investors, minus decreases due
to anticipated future attacks. Thus ECF2 is less than or equal to ECF1. The size of each firms decrease in expected future cash
flows depends on (1) the probability the firm will be subject to future attacks, and (2) the cash flow consequences of future attacks.
Both the expected probability and consequences should be greater for Internet firms and for firms that engage more heavily in
e-business. Thus PV(ECF2)  PV(ECF1) is non-positive, and increasingly negative for firms having higher levels of e-activity
and e-risk. The percentage change in investors wealth due to the attacks is:
Firms Return = PV(ECF2)  PV(ECF1)                           PV(ECF1)
We adjust the Firms Return to back out any market-wide movement in stock prices from time 1 to time 2. This yields the Firms
Abnormal Return:
Firms Abnormal Return = Firms Return  Markets Return
Our first alternative hypothesis, therefore, is:
H1: Other things equal, there is a negative association between a firms abnormal stock return and the extent
of the firms participation in Internet commerce.
This hypothesis is tested using samples of Internet and non-Internet firms. The hypothesis investigates whether investors revised
estimates of negative future risk outcomes depend on the extent of firms Internet activity. We also test H1 individually for B2B
and B2C firms. Our study, therefore, provides a counterpoint to Subramani and Walden (2001), who found positive abnormal
stock returns to firms announcements of e-commerce initiatives during the fourth quarter of 1998, and who examined differences
in reaction between B2B versus B2C firms, among other partitions.
Our second hypothesis focuses on the effect of specific e-risks as opposed to general Internet activity level:
H2: Other things equal, there is a negative association between a firms abnormal stock return and the presence
of specific e-risks.
In order to distinguish between risk adhering to Internet activity in general and risk generated by specific aspects of e-commerce,
we test H2 separately for Internet firms and for control firms. That is, we investigate whether variance in extent of e-risks is
associated with variance in abnormal returns within the Internet firms, and separately within the non-Internet firms.
Following the denial of service attacks, from March to May of 2000, the Nasdaq composite index (dominated by technology and
Internet firms) dropped 37%. This drop likely was fueled in part by investors decisions that even B2B Internet firms lacked clear
P2P (i.e., path to profitability). In April, 2000, the largest shareholder in the Internet holding company Internet Capital Group
announced that it would no longer invest directly in B2B companies (Kroll 2000). A portfolio of ten B2B stocks tracked by Merrill
Lynch lost 38% of its value in March and April (Lyons 2000). By June, 2000, prominent analysts and investors were predicting
that 75% to 80% of Internet firms will cease to exist (Clash 2000, pg. 314). 
STUDY VARIABLES
Our first dependent variable, cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is computed over two different windows. The first window is
a three-day period covering February 7 through one day following the hacker attacks, February 9, 2000. Abnormal returns are
unavailable for the first day of attacks, February 6, because that was a Sunday. The second window is a six-day period that
includes the three-day window and extends for an additional three trading days. We employ this longer window to determine
whether any market reaction observed in the first three days subsequently reverses. In order to avoid confounding the general
effect of the attacks with any additional effects arising from publicity in the business press, we delete three firms from our Internet
sample when testing H1 and H2. These firmsYahoo!, eBay, and Amazon.comwere specifically mentioned in press accounts
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of the attacks. Based on our reading of the business press, we believe few, if any, of the remaining sample firms were subjected
to attacks during the event windows.
To determine the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) during the event period (either the three-day or the six-day period), we follow
the same market model procedures as Chatterjee et al. (2001).
Testing H1 requires a sample of Internet firms. These were obtained from the InternetStockListTM (available at www.wsrn.com).
Parent company internet.com bills this as A comprehensive list of the more than one hundred publicly-traded companies involved
solely in Internet-related business (www.internet.com as of July, 2000).  We defined a dichotomous e-risk variable INET coded
one for firms classified as Internet firms by this source, and zero otherwise. Internet.com dis-aggregates its InternetStockList
into 13 categories based on the nature of a firms business. Two other dichotomous variables were defined using this information.
B2C was coded one for Internet firms identified as e-tailers by InternetStockList, and zero otherwise.  B2B was coded one for
non-e-tail Internet firms and zero otherwise.
To test H2 we derive e-risk metrics from managers statements made in Forms 10-K, filed with the SEC. Item 1 of Form 10-K
usually contains a discussion of the major risks and uncertainties facing the filing firm. Managers of firms that are heavily engaged
in e-commerce typically disclose the resulting risks in item 1.2  We expect that firms highly active in e-commerce will disclose
more e-specific risks than do other firms. One test variable employed is the square root of the number of e-specific risks disclosed,
SQNum. In addition, we divide the e-specific risks into two categories: those that we judge can be controlled by managers, and
un-controllable (environment) risks. Variable CTRL is defined as one if a firm reports one or more controllable e-risks, and zero
otherwise. Variable UTRL is defined as one if a firm discloses one or more un-controllable e-risks. The distinction between
controllable and un-controllable e-risks is useful for managers. If results indicate that specific e-risks generate more negative
CARs and lowerDun & Bradstreet financial ratings, controllable e-risks can be mitigated. 
Table 1.  Definitions of Study Variables
Models:
CAR = f(Test variables, LnMVE) (1)
Panel A:  Dependent Variables
CAR3
CAR6
= cumulative abnormal stock return over a 3-day event window.
= cumulative abnormal stock return over a 6-day event window.







= one if a firm is classified by the InternetStockList as an Internet non-e-tailer as of
June, 2000, and equals zero otherwise.
= one if a firm is an e-tailer, and equals zero otherwise. E-tailer status was based on
classification by the InternetStockList as of June, 2000,supplemented by firms
Form 10-K, Item 1 disclosures.
= one if a firm is classified as an Internet firm by InternetStockList as of June, 2000,
and equals zero otherwise. Equals B2B + B2C.
= the square root of the total number of e-specific risks disclosed by a firm in Item 1
of Form 10-K. 
= one if a firm discloses one or more controllable e-specific risks in Item 1 of Form
10-K.  (See Table 3.) 
= one if a firm discloses one or more un-controllable e-specific risks in Item 1 of
Form 10-K.  (See Table 3.) 
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As a proxy for e-commerce risks, the metrics mentioned above have several favorable features.  First, managers presumably know
their firms activities better than do outside observers. Second, managers have incentives to disclose relevant risks as a means
of averting liability arising from forward-looking statements. Most importantly, from our perspective, the Form 10-K contents
provide e-metrics for all filing firms, not just Internet firms. This allows us to distinguish between higher e and lower e firms
among the non-Internet firms. 
For all sample firms, we obtained the most recent available Form 10-K as of June, 2000. We examined the business risks disclosed
in Item 1 and developed a taxonomy of e-risks, described below.  Risks were designated as e-specific if they arise from buying
and selling over digital media (Kalakota and Robinson 1999, pg. 4), or from internal activities that directly support such
purchases or sales. We do not specify that the digital media employed must be the Internet because much e-commerce is
conducted otherwise (e.g., electronic data interchange via telecommunications). Subsequently, two research assistants employed
the taxonomy to determine how many e-risks each sample firm disclosed. The research assistants made independent judgments
and reconciled differences. The e-risk variables described above (SQNum, CTRL, UTRL) were derived from the 10-K disclosures.
SAMPLES AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Sample
Four samples, designated (i) through (iv) below, are employed to investigate the association between e-risk metrics and perceived
business risks. Most Internet firms have been publicly listed for only a few years. In order to capture incremental e-risk
experienced by Internet firms, we contrast (i) a sample of Internet B2B firms with (ii) a sample of non-Internet firms that made
their initial public offerings (IPOs) at about the same times. In testing H1, these two samples share the business risk inherent in
a short public history of operations, while the Internet firms experience additional e-commerce risks. To test H1 we also contrast
a sample of Internet B2C e-tailers (iii) with a sample of non-Internet retail firms (iv) to control for industry characteristics while
allowing e-risk to vary. Specific e-risk variables are employed to test H2 using samples (i) and (iii) pooled, and separately using
samples (ii) and (iv) pooled. 
Taxonomy of Form 10-K Item 1 E-Risks
For all sample firms, we obtained the most recent available Form 10-K as of June, 2000, so long as the statements were issued
in calendar year 1999 or 2000. We examined the business risks disclosed in Item 1 and developed the taxonomy of e-risks.
Research assistants employed the taxonomy to determine how many e-risks each sample firm disclosed.  The taxonomy of e-risks
that evolved from inspection of the Item 1 disclosures is shown in Table 2, together with information about the frequency of e-risk
disclosures by sample.
Table 2 indicates that the two samples of Internet firms, (i) and (iii), disclose substantially more e-risks of every type than do the
samples of non-Internet firms, (ii) and (iv). In general, the B2C e-tailers, sample (iii), disclose more e-risks than do the B2B non-e-
tailers, sample (i). They also disclose different types of e-risks. Several of the e-risk categories exhibit differences of 20% or more
between samples (i) and (iii). E-tailers are more likely to disclose risk of public non-acceptance, risk of inadequate e-commerce
infrastructure, risk of on-line security breach, risk of government intervention (such as imposition of Internet sales taxes), risk
due to Internet technology change, and risk due to unavailability of domain names. The e-risk disclosures do not appear to be
uniform boiler-plating or random noise. Instead, they vary systematically between the various samples in believable ways. In
particular, the firms designated by InternetStockList as Internet firms disclose more e-risks.
Descriptive Statistics
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the dependent variables by sample. The statistics in panels A and B strongly support
H1. Panel A indicates that the median abnormal stock return cumulated over the three-day window, CAR3, is 4.5% for Internet
B2B firms versus 2.3% for the IPO sample. The median CAR3 for Internet B2C firms is 7.9% versus 2.2% for the retail sample.
These differences in central tendency are both economically and statistically significant. Furthermore, the differences do not
disappear over time. Panel B indicates that median abnormal stock return cumulated over a six-day window, CAR6, is 8.1% and
13.6% for the Internet samples versus 2.6% and 3.7% for the control samples. The differences in central tendency are even more
pronounced after six days. 
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Table 2.  Disclosure of E-specific Risks in Item 1 of Form 10-K

















                 Uncontrollable e-risks
A. Risk of public non-acceptance of e-commerce 42.1% 8.8% 73.1% 5.9%
B. Risk of non-acceptance of e-advertising 23.1% 0.0% 19.2% 0.0%
C. Risk of non-acceptance of e-products 31.4% 12.3% 19.2% 0.0%
D. Risk of government Internet intervention 51.2% 3.5% 80.8% 2.9%
E. Risk due to Internet technology change 33.9% 7.0% 53.8% 2.9%
F. Risk due to unavailable domain names 4.1% 0.0% 34.6% 2.9%
Controllable e-risks
G. Risk of inadequate e-commerce infrastructure 42.1% 1.8% 76.9% 4.4%
H. Risk of inadequate content/service provider 19.8% 3.5% 34.6% 0.0%
I. Risk of on-line security breach 37.2% 3.5% 61.5% 1.5%
J. Risk of off-line customer privacy breach 14.9% 0.0% 11.5% 0.0%
K. Risk due to relations with other Web sites 17.4% 3.5% 23.1% 0.0%
Number of sample firms 121 57 26 68
Table 3.  Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables
Panel A:  CAR3




(i) Internet B2B Firms













Test of Mean (i) = Mean (ii): t-statistic = 3.134
Wilcoxon Z = 3.593
N Mean S. Dev. 1st
Quartlies
Median 3rd
(iii) Internet B2C Firms













Test of Mean (iii) = Mean (iv) t-statistic = 4.455
Wilcoxon Z = 4.404
Panel B:  CAR6




(i) Internet B2B Firms













Test of Mean (i) = Mean (ii): t-statistic = 3.503
Wilcoxon Z = 3.166
N Mean S. Dev. 1st
Quartlies
Median 3rd
(iii) Internet B2C Firms













Test of Mean (iii) = Mean (iv) t-statistic = 3.134
Wilcoxon Z = 3.593
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Table 4.  Model (1) Between-Sample 























B2C   -0.078
(-4.42)*
 
















141 74 215 209
F-statistic 6.55* 9.94* 6.66* 5.26*
Adjusted 
R-squared
7.3% 19.7% 5.0% 5.8%























B2C   -0.133
(-4.71)*
 
















141 74 215 209
F-statistic 11.23 9.94 12.35 9.07
Adjusted 
R-squared
12.8% 19.7% 9.6% 10.4%
Estimated coefficients are presented above (t-statistics). 
P-values less than or equal to 0.10 are highlighted by an asterisk: *.
P-values are one-tailed except for the intercept and for LnMVE.
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RESULTS
Model (1) Results
Model (1) investigates stock market reaction to the hacker attacks of February 678, 2000. Model (1) estimation results that
contrast the Internet samples with the control samples are presented in Table 4. Panel A of Table 4 employs CAR3 as the
dependent variable. All models are significant based on F-statistics. Adjusted R-square values are similar to those observed in
other studies employing short window CARs as dependent variables. Panel A indicates that, controlling for residual differences
in market capitalization, Internet B2B firms CARs are 6.0% less than the IPO control sample CARs. Similarly, Internet B2C
firms CARs are 7.8% less than the retail control sample. When all four samples are combined, the Internet firms CARs are 5.0%
less than control sample CARs. The final result column indicates that number of self-disclosed e-risks, SQNum, has additional
explanatory power beyond Internet status, INET. Firms disclosing more e-risks have lower CARs.
Results presented in Panel B using six-day CARs are similar to those in Panel A but are generally somewhat stronger. Both F-
statistics and Adjusted R-squares are greater in Panel B, and t-statistics for the e-risk variables are more negative, compared to
Panel A.
In summary, Table 4 indicates that all measures of e-risk employed are associated with more negative stock reactions using pooled
samples of Internet and non-Internet firms. Table 5 investigates whether e-risk metrics can explain variance in market reaction
within the Internet firms. Models estimated with only non-Internet firms had insignificant F-statistics and are not presented.
Panel A of Table 5 employs three-day CARs as the dependent variable. All models are significant based on F-statistics. Adjusted
R-square values are similar to those observed in other studies employing short window CARs as dependent variables. The first
results column shows that, controlling for residual differences in firm market cap, Internet B2C firms (e-tailers) experienced CARs
that are 7.9% lower than for the B2B Internet firms. This is reasonable given that, according to the business press, the firms
subjected to hacker attacks predominantly were B2C firms. The second result column indicates that Internet firms disclosing one
or more controllable e-risks experienced more negative abnormal returns. The third result column demonstrates the same is true
for Internet firms that disclosed one or more uncontrollable e-risks.
When both controllable and uncontrollable e-risk variables are entered into the same model, both are insignificant (not tabulated).
The final result column shows that, among Internet firms, those disclosing more e-risks in Item 1 of Form 10-K experienced more
negative abnormal returns. The results when six-day CARs are employed, shown in Panel B, are similar to those in Panel A
although generally weaker.
In summary, the Table 5 results indicate that investors make more sophisticated distinctions than that between Internet and non-
Internet firms. In particular, within the samples of Internet firms, differences in type and numbers of e-risks are significantly
associated with differences in market reaction to the February 2000 hacker attacks. Stock price decreases associated with greater
e-risk appear to persist over time, suggesting a permanent increase in cost of equity for affected firms.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study investigates whether capital markets participants believe e-commerce activity subjects companies to incremental firm-
specific risk. We employ several variables that proxy for the extent of a firms e-commerce risks. First, we employ a dichotomous
variable capturing observers judgments whether a firm sells primarily via the Internet. Additional dichotomous variables are used
to divide Internet firms into two sub-samples. One dichotomous variable represents Internet e-tailers (B2C firms). A second
dichotomous variable represents Internet firms that are not e-tailers (B2B firms). We also obtain e-risk metrics from firms self-
disclosed business risks.
We investigate investors reactions to hacker attacks launched against several of the best-known Internet firms in February 2000.
These occurrences are ideal for an event study of investors reactions to e-risk because (1) the attacks were sudden and unexpected
and (2) the attacks exposed the vulnerability of the best-known and largest Internet firms to risks that are highly specific to e-
commerce. After excluding three firms in our sample that are known subjects of the attacks, we investigate whether the remaining
sample firms experienced contagious negative abnormal stock returns following the attacks. 
Ettredge & Richardson/Assessing the Risk in E-Commerce
2001  Twenty-Second International Conference on Information Systems 283
Table 5.  Model (1) Within-Sample Results























CTRL   -0.049
(-2.27)*
 
UTRL    -0.048
(-2.06)*













118 113 113 113
F-statistic 5.25* 3.56* 3.10* 3.00*
Adjusted 
R-squared
6.8% 4.4% 3.6% 5.2%























CTRL   -0.053
(-1.83)*
 
UTRL    -0.050
(-1.61)*













118 113 113 113
F-statistic 3.96* 2.12 1.74 1.52
Adjusted 
R-squared
4.8* 2.0% 1.3% 0.9%
Estimated coefficients are presented above (t-statistics). 
P-values less than or equal to 0.10 are highlighted by an asterisk: *.
P-values are one-tailed except for the intercept and for LnMVE.
Overall, the findings suggest that managers of firms disclosing controllable e-risks potentially can reduce their costs of equity if
they ameliorate the controllable risks. We do not have sufficient data to determine whether the benefits of reduced cost of capital
would exceed the costs of addressing the controllable risks, and so this issue is left for possible future study.
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